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9. ASSESSING THE CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE TO 
INFORM MORE FLEXIBLE ARRANGEMENTS 
FOR EFFECTIVE ADAPTATION 
William Paul Bell, Craig Froome, Phillip Wild, Liam Wagner 
The University of Queensland 
 
The previous Chapters have identified current institutional arrangements that are 
sources of maladaptation to climate change.  This chapter discusses these sources of 
maladaptation in more detail to provide a measure of adaption to climate change and to 
suggest alternative more flexible arrangements to climate change.  Four key issues 
were identified: 
 
1. fragmentation of the NEM both politically and economically; 
2. accelerated deterioration of the transmission and distribution infrastructure due 
to climate change requiring mechanisms to defer investment in transmission 
and distribution; 
3. lacking mechanisms to develop a diversified portfolio of generation technologies 
and energy sources to reduce supply risk; and 
4. failing to model and to treat the NEM as a national node based entity rather 
than state based. 
 
Section 6.1 discusses how the transmission and distribution infrastructure will be 
subjected to accelerated ageing and subject to more faults from higher winds and 
temperatures.  As discussed, the higher frequency of faults can be ameliorated by 
better design and improved maintenance but both act to increase the cost of installing 
new lines and running existing lines.  This sensitivity of transmission and distribution to 
climate change makes the deferment of transmission investment more important.  This 
chapter particularly scrutinises institutional arrangements to highlight potential sources 
of maladaptation to defer investment in transmission and distribution. 
Stevens (2008, p. 41) discusses if the energy sector infrastructure is to adapt to climate 
change, a totally integrated holistic approach to the provision and management is 
required.  Stevens notes that this approach is particularly relevant to the electricity 
sector and identifies two impediments to achieving suitable outcomes being the 
intensely competitive environment and the diverse ownership of infrastructure.  So, this 
chapter compares the adaptation to climate change of the South Korean and Australian 
electricity systems to provide a gauge to Australia’s success.  The contrast highlights 
the success of the simple institutional structure of South Korea’s national government 
and electricity monopoly over the complex institutional structure of Australia’s State 
Governments and diverse ownership of infrastructure.  Section 4.4 expands upon the 
comparison between these two markets. 
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Section 6.12 discusses the need to develop a portfolio of energy to reduce supply risk 
where the RET provides onshore wind and solar PV with a first mover advantage at the 
expense of a broader portfolio of energy.  This first mover advantage for solar PV is 
exacerbated by the solar bonus built into a feed-in tariff.   
This chapter discusses the four key issues in the following subsections. 
9.1 Feed-in tariffs incorporating a renewable energy bonus 
This section discusses feed-in tariffs incorporating a renewable energy bonus where 
the bonus acts a as a source of maladaptation but an economically neutral and 
sustainable feed-in tariff is essential to the development of a smart grid and adaption to 
climate change for the NEM. 
 
The International Energy Association (IEA 2011c, p. 33) observes that nearly all 
countries now offer or are planning feed-in tariffs for solar PV but debate has shifted 
from ‘if or how to implement a feed-in tariff’ to ‘how to move to a self-sustaining market 
post feed-in tariff’.   
 
This section discusses feed-in tariffs as a source of four market failures: 
 
• inappropriate infant industry assistance; 
• exacerbating inequity; 
• inadequate transmission investment deferment price signal; and 
• poorly targeting myopic investment behaviour. 
 
Additionally, this section discusses a sustainable feed-in tariff regime that addresses 
the four market failures together with an international comparison of feed-in tariffs. 
 
IEA (2011c, p. 33 ) acknowledges internationally feed-in tariffs have been poorly 
designed or poorly controlled resulting in explosive markets, profiteering, political 
interference, over-reliance on imports, market collapses, business closures and so on.  
However there is now a wealth of information available worldwide to policymakers 
regarding the impact of various designs of feed-in tariff schemes and how and when to 
adjust tariffs to avoid overheated markets.  Gipe (2011) provides an extensive and 
current discussion of feed-in tariffs.   
 
Under the guise of an infant industry argument, the states in Australia implemented 
feed-in tariffs to establish the domestic PV industry.  This policy has been overly 
successful but has produced maladaptation by creating inconsistent gross or net feed-
in tariffs calculation across Australia resulting in inconsistent remuneration, causing 
cross subsidy of electricity resulting in inequity to favour the rich over the poor, testing 
policy credibility, creating poorly targeted infant industry assistance and failing to target 
transmission investment deferment. 
 
The problem with infant industry assistance is that the assistance is only intended for a 
limited term but carries the innate problems of when to withdraw assistance and of 
retaining policy credibility when withdrawing assistance.  For instance the ACT Minister 
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for the Environment and Sustainable Development (Corbell 2011b) closed new 
applications for micro feed-in tariffs but successfully ensures policy credibility by 
honouring existing feed-in tariff agreements.  However, Garnaut (2011, p. 15) 
discusses how those consumers receiving feed-in tariffs are being cross-subsidised by 
other consumers, which is economically inefficient.  In agreement, Nelson, Simshauser 
and Kelly (2011) estimate the household impact of feed-in tariffs by income groupings 
and conclude that wealthier households are beneficiaries and the effective taxation rate 
for low income households is three times higher than that paid by the wealthiest 
households.  So, there is a policy dilemma that is maintaining policy credibility 
perpetuates economic inefficiency and social inequity.  
 
A resolution to this policy dilemma would be to maintain feed-in tariffs fixed 
permanently in nominal terms to those consumers contracted, so the influence of the 
agreed feed-in tariffs gradually fades out with time and are replaced by a more 
sustainable feed-in tariff regime. 
 
In addition, developing a more sustainable economically neutral feed-in tariff provides a 
way to internalise the positive externality of deferred transmission and distribution 
investment for investors in embedded generation (Garnaut 2008, p. 452).  However, 
there is debate over whether a feed-in tariff should be paid for the net or the gross 
contribution to the distribution grid.  Farrell (2011, p. 33) discusses the major drawback 
of net metering, which is to optimize the size of a solar array for on-site load rather than 
maximise the solar array.  The economic argument favours gross; this way the investor 
can make the decision to install the generators based on the contribution to the grid, so 
the feed-in tariff rate is based on the locational marginal price (LMP) to provide the right 
price signal for generation investment.  AEMC (2011b) proposes LMP as one of five 
options in the transmission framework review.  Under the gross payment method the 
householder would pay the retail rate for the total electricity consumed whether 
sourced from the grid or from their own generator to provide an incentive for the 
customer to conserve electricity and to provide a profit motive for the retailer.  The 
charge for transmission and distributions costs need itemising on bills, as the customer 
does not use transmission or distributions to consume their own generated supply of 
electricity and to provide a price signal for the deferment in investment in transmission 
and distribution. 
 
The NSW Auditor General (Achterstraat 2011) reviews the solar bonus scheme 
associated with the current gross feed-in tariff and discusses how prior to 2010 NSW 
had a net feed-in tariff.  Additionally, the Auditor General recommends a review of the 
projected cost of the solar bonus scheme to answer the question of sustainability and 
recommends provision be made for an exit strategy.  These changes or 
recommendations indicate that adaption is occurring in the right direction with the 
caveat that the solar bonus scheme is replaced with a sustainable gross feed-in tariff. 
 
The Australian PV Association (APVA 2011) and Watt (2011b) discuss how solar PV 
has reached grid parity, that is electricity generated at the same price as coal plus 
transmission and distribution costs, but parity will be insufficient to ensure the 
appropriate economic level of household PV uptake because people suffer investment 
myopia over the returns from long term investments, such as, the 30-40 year life of a 
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PV unit.  In agreement, Yates and Mendis (2009) and Williams (2011) discuss the 
sensitive of demand for solar PV installation to interest rates and to financing.  A well-
researched market failure of the retirement industry is investment myopia that has 
spurred government intervention in the form of superannuation using a complex array 
of policies including tax breaks for voluntary contributions and compulsory contributions.  
Similarly, the government intervenes to remedy a market failure in the provision of 
tertiary education to offer interest free student loans that provide equity and 
acknowledge the positive externalities of education.  The solar PV industry also 
exhibits investment myopia, positive externalities and equity concerns. 
 
Section 4.7 discusses Origin Energy’s (2007) argument for interest free loans for 
efficient energy investment to address positive externalities and equity concerns.  A 
similar argument can be made for interest free loans for solar PV.  However, people 
usually pay for their solar PV or solar hot water heating installations by increasing their 
house mortgage. This is appropriate in the case of long term investments such as solar 
PV.  This approach works for house owners but not for renters. The fact that 
proportionately more low income individuals rent houses goes some way to account for 
the highest (richest) quintile having twice the rate of solar PV installations compared 
with the lowest (poorest) quintile (Bell & Foster 2012).  The low solar PV penetration in 
the lowest quintile is due to the dual problem of low income and rental accommodation. 
Trying to address this poverty trap with subsidised loans is insufficient. A solution is 
required that acknowledges the tenant-landlord relationship and the consequent 
misalignment of benefits and costs.  Section 10.2.4 further discusses energy poverty. 
 
Foster et al (2011, p. 2) discusses how solar PV has acknowledged potential to defer 
transmission investments, which are largely driven by peak demand.  However, 
residential solar PV is insufficient and there is a requirement for significant commercial 
solar PV installation but unlike countries such as Germany and Spain, Australia has 
until recently very few incentives for commercial installations. Williams (2011) discuss 
the commoditisation of residential solar PV, which is evidence that the residential 
segment of the solar PV market has moved beyond infant industry status and beyond 
infant industry support requirements.  Whereas the large and medium-scale solar PV 
segments are still in their infancy and still warrant direct infant industry support 
because the installation of medium and of large-scale solar PV requires a much higher 
degree of skill than residential solar PV. 
 
In infant industry assistance, Corbell (2011a) announces the first feed-in tariff in 
Australia for large scale solar.  The plan uses a feed-in tariff reverse auction for the two 
large scale solar generation plants capable of powering 7000 homes.  The reverse 
auction appears a much more appropriate method to target an infant industry than the 
oversubscribed fixed micro feed-in tariff.  The advantage of the reverse auction is that 
each time the auction is held the technology matures and the feed-in tariff becomes 
smaller, which provides an inexpensive way to maintain policy integrity and support 
infant industries.  Additionally, the two issues of over subscription and of overly 
supporting an infant industry become redundant.  This large scale feed-in tariff policy is 
a well-adapted approached to climate change compared to the micro feed-in tariffs 
policies. 
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IEA (2011c) and Renewable Energy Policy Network of the 21st Century (REN21 2011) 
provide a comparison of countries’ feed-in tariffs.  REN21 (2011, p. 52) notes that 
Australia, Canada and the US have only state or province feed-in tariff policies, which 
contrasts with all the other countries that have national feed-in tariff policies.  
Australia’s fragmentation of policy by state induces inconsistency among feed-in tariffs 
providing a source of maladaptation.  The Australian Minister for Climate Change 
(Wong 2008) discusses how a CoAG Working Group is considering harmonising state 
feed-in tariffs for solar and other renewable energy technologies where there is a 
proposal for the preparation of an options paper on a nationally consistent approach to 
feed-in tariffs.  However a national policy has yet to appear. 
REN21 (2011, p. 84) compares when various countries and states have adopted a 
feed-in tariff.  The following list compares the adoption dates for the states in the NEM 
with South Korea.  
 
• 2003 South Korea 
• 2007 SA 
• 2008 Qld 
• 2009 ACT, NSW and VIC 
 
This comparison shows that the NEM is institutionally slow at adapting to climate 
change measures compared to South Korea.  Section 4.4 discusses using REN21’s 
(2011, p. 84) international comparison of feed-in tariff adoption year as a climate 
change adoption performance indicator. 
 
Furthermore, the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART 2011) is 
calling for submissions on establishing a fair and reasonable feed-in tariffs for electricity 
generated by small-scale solar PV.  In comparison, IEA (2011c, p. 37) discusses how 
South Korea is one of the first countries to supersede the feed-in tariff where the RPA 
(Renewable Portfolio Agreement) will replace the feed-in tariff scheme in 2012.  Under 
the RPA, the government in conjunction with private enterprise plan to install 1.2 GW 
capacity of solar PV by the end of 2016.  This RPA is another indicator that Australian 
institutions are slow at adapting to climate change. 
9.2 Carbon pollution reduction scheme 
The price signal from the carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS) is intended to 
transform the current portfolio of high CO2 emissions generators in Australia in favour 
of a lower emissions portfolio.  The CPRS starts with a carbon tax in July 2012, which 
converts to an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in July 2015.  The CPRS has the 
following four sources of maladaptation to climate change:  
 
1. CPRS supplanting RET; 
2. ETS market failure; 
3. trading carbon credits internationally; and 
4. international corruption. 
 
Regarding CPRS supplanting RET, Garnaut (2008, p. xxxii) states “There are structural 
reasons to expect market failure in response to carbon pricing in relation to the 
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information required for optimal use of known technologies; to research, development 
and commercialisation of new technologies; and to network infrastructure.”  Garnaut 
(2008, pp. 403-60) suggests using policies to directly address the stated failures that 
will also negate the need for the RET.  However, under CPRS without RET gas 
generators can simply replace coal generators.  This coal to gas transformation would 
fail to diversify Australia’s portfolio of energy sources.  Furthermore, CPRS in 
conjunction with RET ameliorates the effects of domestic corruption and political 
lobbying.  Section 9.4 further discusses the RET.   
Section 9.6 discusses Garnaut’s (2008, p. xxxii) comments regarding network 
infrastructure market failure. 
 
Regarding ETS market failure, Ellerman and Joskow (2008) discuss three market 
failures in the European Union (EU) ETS, being over allocation, price volatility and 
windfall profits for generators.  Ellerman and Joskow (2008) consider these learning 
experiences, which can be overcome by using more accurate information, by allowing 
the banking of credits between compliance periods and by increasing the frequency of 
auctioning.  Despite these learning experiences, Lewis (2011) reports on a further EU 
ETS collapse in carbon prices, which results from a combination of over allocation and 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis in Europe.  The EU ETS provides Australia 
with many valuable lessons and shows that developing a robust ETS comes with many 
unforseen problems, so it is prudent to maintain the RET.  
 
Regarding trading carbon credits internationally, Garnaut (2008) discusses how trading 
provides a mechanism to lower the overall costs to the world of the transformation to 
lower CO2 emissions.  However, this trading proposal has three major problems being, 
international corruption, losing government revenue, and losing a policy tool to promote 
renewable energy sources domestically. 
 
In relation to international corruption, Transparency International (TI 2011) produces an 
international corruption perception index on 182 countries.  Table 9-1 shows the 16 
least corrupt countries where Australia is ranked 8th.  The index compiles the results 
form a number of surveys to allow basic statistical analysis.  Since most of the world 
ranks as more corrupt than Australia, this does raise credibility issues over an 
international trade in carbon credits.  For instance in the least corrupt country New 
Zealand (NZ), Stock (2011) reports on the NZ ETS experience in trading carbon credits 
internationally where the price for a NZ Unit (NZU) went from $22 in May 2011 to $11 
in late November 2011.  This halving in the price of a NZU was the result of NZ 
emitters’ ability to import carbon credits.  However Stock (2011) claims that some of the 
UN-backed Certified Emissions Reductions (CER) are of suspect validity and predicts 
that the New Zealand Government will substantially curtail the import of CER. 
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Table 9-1 International Corruption Perception Index for 2011 
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Max Min Lower bound 
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1 New Zealand 9.5 1 9 0.05 9.7 9.1 9.4 9.5 
2 Denmark 9.4 2 8 0.05 9.5 9.1 9.3 9.5 
2 Finland 9.4 2 8 0.07 9.8 9.1 9.3 9.5 
4 Sweden 9.3 4 9 0.08 9.7 8.9 9.2 9.4 
5 Singapore 9.2 5 12 0.13 9.5 8.1 8.9 9.4 
6 Norway 9.0 6 9 0.07 9.3 8.7 8.9 9.1 
7 Netherlands 8.9 7 9 0.11 9.3 8.1 8.7 9.1 
8 Australia 8.8 8 11 0.12 9.4 8.2 8.6 9.0 
8 Switzerland 8.8 8 8 0.22 9.4 7.5 8.4 9.1 
10 Canada 8.7 10 9 0.15 9.3 8.1 8.4 8.9 
11 Luxembourg 8.5 11 8 0.25 9.1 7.1 8.1 8.9 
12 Hong Kong 8.4 12 11 0.17 9.1 7.3 8.1 8.7 
13 Iceland 8.3 13 8 0.27 9.5 7.1 7.8 8.7 
14 Germany 8.0 14 10 0.18 9.1 7.1 7.8 8.4 
14 Japan 8.0 14 12 0.27 9.1 5.7 7.6 8.5 
16 Austria 7.8 16 10 0.24 8.9 6.7 7.4 8.2 
(Source: TI 2011) 
 
The credibility problem could be overcome by only allowing the buying of carbon 
credits from selected countries, such as the highly ranked countries in Table 9-1.  
However, the problems of losing government revenue and of dissipating CPRS’s role to 
promote renewable generation still exist. 
9.3 Mineral resource rent tax supplementing the CPRS 
This section discusses how the mineral resource rent tax (MRRT) is necessary to 
supplement the CPRS as the CPRS fails to address or causes the following two 
maladaptations to climate change: 
 
• exporting fossil fuels; and 
• exporting the additional fossil fuels that CPRS will make uneconomical to burn 
in Australia 
 
The CPRS will reduce the use of coal for electricity generation in Australia, which is 
effective for CO2 emissions reduction in Australia.  However this reduction in coal use 
means that more coal is available for export and unless every coal importing country 
has similar policy measures to Australia, then the Australian CPRS has only succeeded 
in switching the location of where the CO2 is emitted.  The switching problem is a 
maladaptation to climate change and is an unintended consequence of the NEM’s 
adaption to climate change.  
 
In addition to the switching problem there is the increasing use of coal overseas.  For 
instance Bardsley (2011) reports on China’s increase use of power and implementing 
renewable energy but there is also an overall increase in coal use.  The amount of coal 
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Australia burns compared to the amount exported is trivial, so the Australian CPRS in 
isolation is really just tokenism. 
 
Introducing the MRRT addresses the gap in the CPRS by helping coal importing 
countries moderate their use of coal and addressing the switching problem. The MRRT 
is a win for climate change but is also a win for Australia for the following five reasons: 
 
• fossil fuels are finite; 
• the temporary resource boom causes capital destruction in other more long 
term industries; 
• MRRT is superior to resource royalties by maximising revenue from the 
economic rent; 
• MRRT may moderate the more destructive mineral exploration, so protect the 
Australian environment; and 
• the revenue from the MRRT provides funds for a sovereign or future fund or 
capital development. 
 
Fossil fuels are a finite resource, which Shafiee and Topal (2009) estimate depletion 
time of 35, 107 and 37 years for oil, coal and gas respectively, so it is important for 
Australia to derive benefit by extracting the maximum economic rent from their sale 
over their short life.  Shafiee and Topal’s (2009) estimated depletion time for gas may 
have to be revised given the recent CSG discoveries.  Additionally, many of the 
shareholders of resources companies are foreign, so the profits go overseas, which 
compounds the requirement to extract the maximum economic rent for Australia.  In 
particular, China’s managed exchange rate has enabled China to build up huge foreign 
reserves, which can be used to buy Australian resources companies, so China can 
obtain most of the economic rent.  AAP (2011) reports on China's 'resource 
imperialism' as a risk for Australia and that the state of China is not playing by the 
same short term gains of the capitalist society and it is naïve to assume everything is 
fine.  This sentiment is echoed in Burrell (2011) who quotes the Premier of Western 
Australia after the sale of Premier Coal to China "From the state's point of view, the 
Premier Coal project is the major supplier of coal to the state-owned coal power 
stations, … That contract will continue, but we do have some concerns about security 
of supply and what this means for the long term.”  A MRRT would help conserve and 
maintain mineral resources as a strategic asset. 
 
The resources boom is causing a high and volatile exchange rate for Australia.  
According to traditional economic theory, the economy adjusts to the high exchange 
rate by people switching employment from declining areas of the economy, such as 
tourism and manufacturing, into the mining sector.  However Keen (2011) discusses 
this simple switching of employment or economic restructuring as a free trade fallacy 
because there is an associated cost of the capital destruction in manufacturing and 
tourism, as the capital loses value and falls into disrepair.  Furthermore Lamont (2011) 
comments that the economic restructuring could possibly be justified if mining was a 
permanent way of life but resource booms bust and mineral resources are finite.  
Lamont (2011) recommends the MRRT as a way to moderate exchange rate 
fluctuations and ameliorate the capital destruction effect in the manufacturing and 
tourism sectors. 
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An explanation of the prisoner’s dilemma as a model of cooperation and conflict is 
introduced because the dilemma captures the cooperation and conflict aspects of the 
MRRT at both the interstate and international levels.  The classic dilemma centres 
around two isolated unconvicted prisoners guilty of the same crime but the police are 
unable to convict either prisoner.  If both prisoners remain silent, they both received 
relatively short sentences.  If either prisoner confesses to convict the other prisoner, 
they walk free and the other prisoner receives a very long sentence.  If they both 
confess to convict one another, both receive a medium sentence.  Assuming a one off 
situation and that both prisoners behave selfishly, both prisoners confess to convict 
one another.  But if the situation is repeated and the prisoners can communicate, the 
outcome would favour cooperation.  The analogy between the prisoner’s dilemma and 
MRRT is that cooperation between governments leads to higher revenue and 
selfishness between governments leads to poorer revenues but there is always the 
incentive to cheat on any MRRT agreement. 
 
Henry (2009, p. xvii) considers tax on the following four items the most robust and 
efficient taxes: 
 
• personal income; 
• business income; 
• private consumption; and 
• economic rent from land and resources – (MRRT). 
 
Henry (2009, p. xvii) recommends that resource royalties be replaced by the MRRT.  In 
agreement, Verrender (2011) discusses how the state based royalty system is 
antiquated and inefficient and how inconsistencies in state and federal taxation cause 
investment misallocation and where investors can play one state off against another 
undermining taxation efforts.  Additionally, Taylor (2011) discusses how the states 
undermine the Federal Governments tax revenue.  Replacing the state based royalties 
and federal tax on minerals with a MRRT, which the state and Federal Governments 
could share, would help maximise tax revenue from economic rent and avoid these 
prisoner’s dilemma scenarios.  However, Henry (2009, p. xvii) concedes that the 
revenue from MRRT will be more volatile than from the existing resource royalties, 
which the MRRT will replace. 
 
The resource boom has generated exploration of gas from new sources such as coal 
seam gas.  For instance Roberts (2011) reports on a claim from Santos that the only 
way to meet the surge in demand for gas are unconventional methods such as coal 
seam gas extraction.  But Klan (2011) discusses how the process of extracting coal 
seam gas damages the aquifers and uses a carcinogenic mixture of benzene, toluene, 
ethyl-benzene and xylenes (BTEX) to aid the cracking of the aquifers to release the 
gas in a process called fracking.  Darling (2011b), the Queensland Minster of the 
Environment, discusses the results of an investigation into the carcinogenic 
contaminants formaldehyde and thiocyanate found in aquifers near a Kingaroy site 
using the coal seam gas extracting chemical where the contaminates were most likely 
the results of agricultural practices, as such, there is some uncertainty over the 
possible contamination that may be caused by coal seam gas extraction.  A resource 
boom is short lived compared to the aquifers, which if left uncontaminated and 
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managed could provide Australia with a permanent source of water and given the 
projected decreases in rainfall these aquifers become more important.  The MRRT 
would moderate this extreme form of exploration, so help to preserve the aquifers and 
coal seam gas until a less toxic and damaging technique is developed to remove the 
gas.  The ABC (2011b) reports on moves by the Western Australian Government to 
introduce legislation to require public disclosure of environmental management reports 
for fracking projects and the Queensland Minister of the Environment (Darling 2011a) 
announced a ban on BTEX, so there appears some adaption to moderate the potential 
harm from this process.   
 
Norway and Chile are mineral resource rich countries that have successfully 
implemented a MRRT to provide reserves of foreign exchange in a sovereign or future 
fund.  However, Hepworth (2011c) reports the second biggest mining company in the 
world called Vale is warning that new mining investments in Australia are at risk 
because of the CPRS and MRRT and alternative countries for investment will be sort.  
This situation is another prisoner’s dilemma scenario where there is the potential for 
Australia to promote the MRRT internationally through an organisation of mineral 
exporting countries.  An international MRRT would help moderate bubbles, CO2 
emissions and increase government revenues for mineral exporting countries. 
9.4 Renewable energy targets 
Table 6-1 shows the renewable energy targets (RET) that are the required GWh of 
renewable source electricity legislated by the Australian Government (2011) in the 
Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000. 
 
The objects of this Act are: 
 
(a) to encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources; and 
(b) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector; and 
(c) to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable. 
 
This is done through the issuing of certificates for the generation of electricity using 
eligible renewable energy sources and requiring certain purchasers (called liable 
entities) to surrender a specified number of certificates for the electricity that they 
acquire during a year. 
 
This section discusses each object of the RET legislation for sources of maladaptation 
in an order that aids clarity of argument. 
 
Object (b) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector  
Garnaut (2008, p. xxxii) states that “No useful purpose is served by other policies that 
have as their rationale the reduction of emissions from sectors covered by the trading 
scheme [CPRS]. The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target should be phased out.”  In 
an ideal world the phase out of RET is totally warranted but there are at least four 
considerations that make the use of two policy instruments to address one policy target 
necessary, being: 
 
 Analysis of institutional adaptability    193 
 
• market failure; 
• corruption; 
• political lobbying; and 
• conflict of interest. 
 
The previous section discusses the market failure of EU ETS and that Garnaut (2008, p. 
xxxii) expects market failure in Australia’s response to carbon pricing due to structural 
problems.  The RET would provide a backup policy to achieve carbon emissions 
reductions when the Australian ETS fails.  Garnaut also proposes trading carbon 
emission abatements internationally.  However, if Australia were importing carbon 
emission abatements from Europe right now, the failure of the European ETS would 
push down the price of imported carbon emission abatements, which would undermine 
Australian efforts to reduce carbon emissions and undermine support for developing 
electricity from renewable energy.  
 
Furthermore, the previous section also discusses the experience of the NZ ETS and 
the corruption in the UN-backed CER, which would have similar consequences for an 
Australian ETS as the European ETS market failure described above.  Again the RET 
provides a safety net for renewable energy generators and carbon emission abatement 
against ETS corruption or contagion from ETS market failure elsewhere. 
 
In addition, Section 6.7 discusses the conflict of interest between state ownership of 
coal generators and private companies or individuals introducing renewable energy 
generators, particularly onshore wind generation.  Parkinson (2011b) discusses 
Victorian legislation introduced to restrict new onshore wind generating capacity and 
block expansions of the interconnectors between SA and Victoria, which will prevent 
the flow of surplus electricity from SA’s wind generators to the rest of the NEM.  The 
RETs provide protection for renewable generators against such politically induced 
maladaptation. 
 
The coal industry as a political lobby group has fought a long battle with the 
government over the introduction of the CPRS and MRRT.  For instance Orr and 
Costar (2012) discuss the Australian Electoral Commission’s slow disclosure of political 
lobbying and donations “More successful were the big miners… The Mining Council of 
Australia reported $4 million and the Association of Mining Export Companies $2.2 
million. But this was just the tail-end of the anti-mining tax campaign, the bulk of which 
(over $22 million more in advertising) had been spent in the previous financial year and 
helped bring down Rudd’s prime ministership.”  This slow disclosure is a flaw in the 
electoral process that undermines the democratic process and is a source of 
maladaptation to climate change.  Orr and Costar (2012) call for a real time disclosure 
of political lobbying and donations via a publically accessible website among other 
measures to remedy the situation.  These measures would address this source of 
maladaptation. 
 
There is no doubt that the coal lobby group will try to water down the CPRS once the 
ETS is introduced.  The mining industry has the wealth to instigate further national 
advertising campaigns against the CPRS and MRRT.  The renewable energy sector is 
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fragmented and small in comparison.  The RET protects the renewable energy sector 
in case the coal lobby is successful in undermining the CPRS. 
 
CoAG (2009) proposes a “review of the operation of the RET scheme will be 
undertaken in 2014 to coincide with the review of the CPRS so that the review of RATE 
[RET-affected, trade-exposed] assistance can be conducted in parallel with the 
planned review of assistance for EITE [emissions-intensive, trade-exposed] industries.”  
This CoAG review of the RET and the CPRS is an area of policy uncertainty.  Intense 
pressure from the coal industry could see the CPRS watered down and the RET expire, 
which would hamper the development of renewable generation. 
 
Object (c) to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable 
The CPRS in isolation would fail to meet this object for two reasons, the import of 
cheap carbon emission abatement credits and the substitution of gas for coal as a 
source of energy.  
 
Object (a) to encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable 
sources  
This object uses the plural of source but so far the RET has reinforced the first mover 
advantage of onshore wind and solar PV generation.  There lacks a mechanism to 
develop a portfolio of generator technologies and energy sources to reduce risk of 
supply.  For instance, Ball et al. (2011) discuss how historically Australia’s ample 
supply of coal has underpinned its power system but competing countries have used a 
variety of different energy sources and, as a result of this diversity, many have a more 
resilient power system to provide future electrical power. 
 
However, given the policy uncertainty surrounding CPRS, the requirement for a 
broader portfolio of energy generation and the first mover advantage of onshore wind 
and small scale solar PV, a more selective RET that allocated targets to specific 
renewable energy generation and size would help reduce policy uncertainty and 
expand the portfolio of energy to better meet the original intent of the legislation ‘to 
encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources’.  
 
For instance, a selective RET for solar thermal and large scale PV would help address 
the failure of the Solar Dawn Project and the Moree Solar Project to strike power 
purchase agreements, which are a necessary pre-requisite to obtain finance from the 
banks (Parkinson 2011a).  A selective RET would require some coordination to ensure 
that the renewable energy generator could be commercial deployed. 
 
Rather than using the RET, Garnaut (2008, p. xxiii) suggests addressing the expected 
market failure in carbon pricing with policies on research, development and 
commercialisation of new technologies.  The Moree Solar and Solar Dawn Projects’ 
failure to achieve a power purchase agreement show that the current research, 
development and commercialization policies are insufficient without a more selective 
RET based on energy technology and size.  Additionally, there is a requirement to 
improve power purchases agreements (PPA) processes to finalise a project.  Sections 
12.3.1 and 12.3.2 further discuss RET and PPA, respectively. 
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9.5 Smart Grids 
“A Smart Grid is an electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all 
users connected to it - generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to 
efficiently deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies.”  (Smart Grids 
2011) 
 
This section discusses smart grids to provide climate change adaption indicators for 
use in section 4.4 to test a proposition regarding the institutional structure best suited to 
adapt to climate change.  Smart Grid (2011) considers seven components comprise a 
smart grid: 
 
• the smart grid; 
• the smart house; 
• renewable energy; 
• consumer engagement; 
• operations centres; 
• distributed intelligence; and 
• plug-in vehicles. 
 
There is a need for a number of climate change adaption indicators to measure all 
seven components.  Additionally, some of these components are dependent on 
another component, so a plan to manage the implementation of a smart grid is required.  
For instance the Korea Smart Grid Institute (KSGI 2011) manages the Korean 
government’s smart grid road map shown in Table 9-2 and uses the interrelating 
components in its definition of a smart grid:  
 
1) Smart Power Grid 
Open power grids will be built to allow various kinds of interconnections between 
consumption and supply sources.  The roll-out of such networks will pave the way 
for new business models, and the building of a power grid malfunction and 
automatic recovery system that will ensure a reliable and high quality power 
supply.  
 
2) Smart Consumer 
It aims to encourage consumers to save energy by using real-time information 
and producing smart home appliances that operate in response to electric utility 
rates. 
 
3) Smart Transportation  
It aims to build a nationwide charging infrastructure that will allow electric vehicles 
to be charged anywhere.  It also establishes a V2G (Vehicle to Grid) system 
where the batteries of electric vehicles are charged during off-peak times while 
the resale of surplus electricity takes place during peak times.    
 
4) Smart Renewable  
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It aims to build a smart renewable energy power generation complex across the 
nation by rolling out microgrids. This will ultimately lead to the emergence of 
houses, buildings, and villages which can achieve energy self-sufficiency through 
the deployment of small-scale renewable energy generation units in every end-
user premise.   
 
5) Smart Electricity Service 
With the launch of a variety of energy-saving electricity rate plans, this service 
aims to improve consumers’ right-to-choose by satisfying their different needs.  In 
addition, it wants to deliver a wide array of added electricity services through the 
marriage of electricity and ICT, and to put in place real-time electricity trading 
system for the transactions of electricity and derivatives. 
 
Table 9-2 South Korea's Smart Grid Roadmap 
 
(Source: KSGI 2011) 
 
KSGI (2011) discusses a ‘test-bed’ funding of a total of 64.5 billion won, which will be 
invested between 2009 and 2013 on Jeju Island in the first stage of the roadmap.  Jeju 
is located off the most southerly tip of Korea.  Jeju offers isolations from the mainland 
grid and offers high levels of solar radiation and wind speeds to test the integration of 
renewable energy.  Additionally, Jeju is a semi-autonomous region, so modifying 
legislation to accommodate smart grid technology is more readily achieved.  Jeju had a 
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population of 531,887 in 2005 and area of 1,848 km2, so the test-bed is of significant 
dimensions.  The second stage of the roadmap is a rollout of smart grid technology to 
the mainland’s metropolitan areas and the third stage to the remainder of South Korea.  
The monopoly ownership of both transmission and distribution by the Korean Electric 
Power Company (KEPCO) allows an easily coordinated deployment of smart grid 
technology.  Korea is leading the world in an integrated approach to deployment of 
smart grid technology.  A report by KSGI on the first stage of the deployment is due out 
in May 2013 in the Korean language. 
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA 2011b) also recognises the importance of 
energy efficiency, decentralised energy or distributed generation, renewable heat and 
thermal storage (BLUE Map scenario) to improve demand flexibility, while real-time 
pricing and dynamic communication with smart energy networks to accommodate an 
increased share of intermittent renewable electricity, helping to reduce the need for 
expensive electricity storage. 
 
Seoul and South Korea are also good examples of decentralised energy and 
innovation. For example, the Seoul Metropolitan decentralised energy network is the 
third largest decentralised energy network in the world supplying electricity and thermal 
heating and cooling to more than 1 million households and nearly 2,000 customers of 
commercial and public buildings across a 1,500km network. Innovation includes the 
development of double lift heat fired absorption chillers using the district heating 
network and the utilisation of LNG. 
 
Italy is the world leader in deployment of smart meters, where the former state owned 
monopoly utility called Ente Nazionale per l'Energia eLettrica (Enel 2011) deployed 33 
million smart meters over a five year period from 2001.   
 
However more recently in Australia, the Prime Minister et al. (Gillard et al. 2010) 
announced a $100 million funding agreement for the ‘Smart Grid, Smart City’ program.  
The CSIRO (2010a) discuss how ‘Smart Grid, Smart City’ “will deploy a live, integrated, 
commercial size smart grid in the Newcastle area, with parts of the trial also conducted 
in Newington, Sydney's central business district (CBD), Ku-ring-gai and Scone, NSW”.  
The results of this test bed will be available to other electricity companies to enable a 
piecemeal national rollout of smart grid technology.  Smart Grid Australia (SGA 2011) 
discusses the importance of R&D conducted in parallel with these test installations to 
better inform the national rollout. 
 
The following section further discusses the relationship between monopoly ownership 
and climate change performance outcomes.  Smart Grid (2011) and KSGI (2011) in 
Table 9-2 provide a list of potential climate change adaption indicators, which section 
4.4 further discusses.  Potential indicators include: 
 
• roadmap; 
• real time power grid monitoring; 
• digital power transmission; 
• smart meters and home management systems; 
• smart appliances; 
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• consumer choice over dynamic pricing; 
• plug-in electric vehicles and infrastructure; 
• power storage; 
• renewable energy penetration and integration; 
• home power generation / Feed-in tariffs; 
• consumer engagement / time of use programs; 
• self-healing grid; and 
• improving visualisation of grid and sharing of information. 
 
9.6 Institutional complexity and the NEM grid as a natural 
monopoly  
Chapters 4 and 6 find institutional fragmentation induced maladaptation to climate 
change particularly present in transmission and distribution.  The more detailed 
analysis in the previous sections finds that fragmentation induced maladaptation is 
apparent in the feed-in tariff, CPRS with MRRT and smart grid.  These three sources of 
fragmentation induced maladaptation contribute directly or indirectly to maladaptation 
of the transmission and distribution networks. 
 
Regarding political fragmentation, REN21 (2011, p. 52) groups Australia, Canada and 
the US together as unique amongst other countries in their response to climate change 
being state or province based rather than national.  Section 2.3 also discusses state 
based ownership of transmission and distribution as a cause of fragmentation 
maladaptation. This fragmentation induced maladaptation becomes apparent when 
facing a major challenge such as adaption to climate change, which requires numerous 
simultaneous changes to the grid to accommodate renewables and smart grid 
technologies.  For instance the California Energy Commission (CEC 2009, p. 5) states 
“major regional transmission projects that involve multiple jurisdictions and utilities and 
are needed for integrating remote resources, reducing costs, improving market 
operations, providing long term strategic benefits and improving operating flexibility, 
don’t have a clear path forward.”  As, simultaneously coordinating changes across a 
grid, can affect all the owners in different ways, then meeting the vested interest of 
multiple owners quickly becomes an intractable problem.  Garnaut (2008, p. 446) 
describes transmission as a market failure requiring attention.  AEMC (2011b, p. iv) 
proposes a single national co-ordinating transmission network service provider (TNSP) 
to manage the planning of all transmission assets in the NEM and a NEM wide 
transmission business to manage locational marginal pricing for generators (AEMC 
2011b, pp. iii-iv).  These two companies could partially address the fragmentation 
maladaptation by transforming the NEM’s transmission into a pseudo monopoly.  
However the proposal adds yet another two companies operating in NEM adding to the 
complexity.  Garnaut (2008, p. 446) discuss the public good aspects of interconnectors. 
 
• Public goods—Infrastructure that is a pure public good (that is, non-rival and 
non-excludable) may be underprovided because the infrastructure provider is 
unable to capture the full benefits of its investment. 
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• Natural monopoly—Where infrastructure is best provided by a single firm, the 
firm may, without competition or regulation, underprovide and overcharge for 
use of the infrastructure. 
 
The whole of the transmission and distribution in Korea is treated as a public good and 
forms a single natural monopoly called KEPCO, but KEPCO also owns most of the 
generation in Korea, which is not a natural monopoly.  As discussed, Korea’s response 
to climate change has been much faster than Australia, so the proposition that 
Australia’s slow response is caused by institutional fragmentation will be discussed 
further in section 4.4. 
 
What follows is a comparison between the Korean and Australian transmission and 
distribution.   Table 9-3 shows the size of the Korean transmission system with a total 
transmission length of 30,676 km operated by KEPCO.  In comparison six transmission 
companies in the NEM operate just over 40,000 km of transmission (Grid Australia 
2011).  In addition the NEM also has some privately owned interconnectors. 
 
Table 9-3 Size of the South Korean transmission system 
Branches 
Line length (km) Supports (unit) 
Overhead Underground Total Steel towers Other Total 
765 kV 835 0 835 902 0 902 
345 kV 8,326 254 8,580 11,176 13 11,189 
154 kV 18,249 2,528 20,777 26,703 406 27,109 
66 kV 252 1 253 610 384 994 
180 kV HVDC 29 202 231 0 617 617 
Total 27,691 2,985 30,676 39,391 1,420 40,811 
(Source: KEPCO 2011 Transmission) 
 
Table 9-4 shows the size of the Korean distribution system with a total line length of 
428,259 km in 2010.  Business Wire (2010) reports that KEPCO is South Korea's sole 
power distributor, serving 13 million households. 
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Table 9-4 Size of the South Korean distribution system 
Year Length (km) Transformers Supports 
2010 428,259 101,692 8,343 
2009 420,257 99,629 8,218 
2008 410,014 96,865 8,052 
2007 401,485 92,964 7,895 
2006 393,304 88,266 7,608 
(Source: KEPCO 2011 Distribution) 
 
In comparison the NEM serves 8 million end users (AEMO 2011g) with thirteen 
distribution companies as shown in Table 9-5. 
 
Table 9-5 Distribution and transmission companies operating in the NEM 
State Distribution 
Companies 
Transmission 
Companies 
NSW 3 2 
VIC 5 1 
QLD 2 1 
SA 1 1 
TAS 1 1 
ACT 1 0 
Total 13 6 
(Source: EUAA 2011) 
 
Furthermore, Australia, Canada and the US have state or province base policy 
responses to climate change (REN21 2011, p. 52), which provides these counties with 
similar institutional fragmentation problems.  Table 9-6 compares the electricity 
consumption and production in kWh and GDP for Australia, Canada, US and South 
Korea.  GDP is given in purchasing power parity (PPP) equivalent in millions of US 
dollars.  
 
Table 9-6 International fragmentation comparison - raw data 
Raw data Australia Canada US South Korea 
Consumption (GWh) 225,400 549,500 3,741,000 402,000 
Production (GWh) 232,000 604,400 3,953,000 417,300 
GDP (PPP US$ millions) 882,400 1,330,000 14,660,000 1,459,000 
States or Provinces 8 13 51 1 
(Source: CIA 2011) 
 
Table 9-7 is the electricity consumption and production and GDP in Table 9-6 divided 
by the number of political entities in the country that is state, province or territory. 
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Table 9-7 International fragmentation comparison per political entity 
Per political entity Australia Canada US South Korea 
Consumption (GWh) 28,175 42,269 73,353 402,000 
Production (GWh) 29,000 46,492 77,510 417,300 
GDP (PPP US$ millions)  110,300 102,308 287,451 1,459,000 
 
Table 9-7 shows that Australia has the smallest amount of power administered by a 
political entity, which means even in comparison with the other fragmented countries, 
Australia has more political overhead per unit of electricity consumed or produced.  As 
for GDP per political entity, Australia and Canada appear comparable in that each 
political entity administers about one third the GDP per political entity in the US.  This 
high political overhead per unit of electricity and low GDP per political entity 
corresponds with the slow response to climate change for each political entity in 
Australia.  Australia is the most fragmented of the fragmented group of three countries, 
where there is duplication of effort over relatively little electricity with relatively few 
resources. 
 
These fragmentation or coordination and planning problems in NEM are recognised by 
the MCE and by the establishment of the AEMO and AEMC and the numerous reports 
addressing coordination problems.  However, the AEMC (2010) role is “to be the rule 
maker for national energy markets … [AEMC’s] key responsibilities are to consider rule 
change proposals, conduct energy market reviews and provide policy advice”  AEMC 
(2009, p. viii) comments on their terms of reference “MCE does not anticipate that this 
review will result in fundamental revision of market design …”. So, recommending a 
rationalisation and amalgamation of the ownership of transmission and distribution 
would be beyond the scope of the AEMC’s brief.  Hence, there appears no obvious 
mechanism in Australia to achieve the rationalisation that has occurred in South Korea 
to transmission and distribution, which was the product of the Japanese occupation 
followed by a series of military dictatorships.  In contrast each state within Australia in 
isolation developed transmission and distribution systems, which were natural 
monopolies.  However these once independent systems are now linked producing one 
natural monopoly with multiple owners.  In agreement, Stevens (2008, p. 24) 
recognises that there are strategic national planning problems to meet climate change 
due to the diverse ownership, particularly in the electricity sector, which may require 
government intervention to achieve desired outcomes.  For instance, South East 
Queensland Water (SEQWater 2011) and SEQ Water Grid (2011) provide an example 
of government intervention promoting rationalisation following the linking of once 
independent natural monopolies.  
 
Following the water reforms, the Queensland Minister for Energy and Water 
(Robertson 2011a) discusses the approval of a new Workforce Framework to protect 
the rights of staff being moved between councils and SEQ distributor-retailers.   The 
framework’s principles reassured workers that labour savings was not the driver for the 
SEQ water reforms.  The framework protects the rights of workers for three years.  This 
sort of measure is an important consideration when the word rationalisation is 
mentioned as people fear the loss of their jobs.  This fear would be a source of 
maladaptation to climate change pending any rationalisation.  
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In addition the National Broadband Network (NBN 2011) provides an example of a 
government lead initiative of a natural monopoly to transform Australia’s copper 
telecommunications network into fibre optics.  This transformation would become far 
more logistically challenging if the telecommunications network had a similar 
fragmented ownership pattern to the NEM.  The NEM will undergo similar 
transformations with the introduction of smart grid technologies, such as real-time 
measurement and smart metering where both projects would benefit from monopoly 
purchasing power and reduced coordination costs.  Both these technologies can defer 
investment in transmission and distribution.  Smart Grid Australia (2011) suggests that 
the NBN also provides the means to deliver aspects of smart grid technology. 
 
The use of distributed generation within a smart grid can defer investment in 
transmission and distribution.  To accommodate distributed generation, the NEM is 
undergoing a transformation from the traditional unidirectional generator-transmission-
distribution-consumer model to a distributed and bidirectional model, where a 
combined transmission and distribution monopoly is better placed to coordinate the 
transformation.  For instance the Korean Smart Grid Institute (2011) discusses Korea’s 
smart grid road map with near completion of the test bed in Jeju Island and with an 
expected national rollout starting in 2012 for completion in 2030.  KEPCO’s monopoly 
transmission and distribution is well suited to accommodate this transformation.  
 
In a further source of maladaptation, Garnaut (2008, p. 452) discusses how the 
revenue of a distribution businesses is calculated on the value of the asset base, which 
creates the incentive to build more distribution infrastructure.  So, promoting distributed 
energy is in direct conflict with this arrangement.  In agreement, Hepworth (2011b) 
reports on an Energy Users Association of Australia (EUAA 2011) report, which claims 
a systematic bias towards inflated forecasts of the capital and operating spending when 
their tariffs were set.  Furthermore, Hepworth (2011b) reports that the most costly 
increase in consumer electricity bills are in transmission and fossil fuel costs.  
Hepworth (2011b) reports the Chairman of the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
Andrew Reeve saying how the rules governing the charging for electricity networks had 
to change. 
 
Regarding an impediment to the NEM adapting to climate change, the traditional role of 
mergers and acquisitions to enforce capital discipline and rationalise the market is 
lacking in the NEM’s transmission and distribution as the majority of transmission and 
distribution is held by state owned companies.  In contrast, David (2011) discusses 
acquisition of privately owned transmission companies in the Philippines.  The National 
Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP) has petitioned the Energy Regulatory 
Commission (ERC) to buy the transmission assets of the Cebu Energy Development 
Corporation (CEDC) for provisional approval authorising NGCP to acquire the assets of 
CEDC.  However, state ownership in Australia acts as an impediment to this form of 
rationalisation, so rationalisation would require political inspiration. 
 
In another conflict of interest to defer transmission investment by the introduction of 
distributed generation is the state ownership of the coal generators where attaching 
distributed energy to the grid only provides competition for the coal generators.  For 
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instance Parkinson (2011b) discusses legislative moves in Victoria to block further 
onshore wind generation and an interconnector expansion between SA and VIC. 
 
Under the current framework, the AEMC (2009, p. vi) discusses the lack of appropriate 
mechanism to address the addition of cluster of generators in geographic remote 
locations where these clusters are primarily onshore wind generation encouraged by 
the RET.  Garnaut (2008, p. 448) also discusses the cluster problem and associated 
free rider problem.  Adopting a monopoly transmission and distribution company would 
fail to completely solve this cluster problem but does significantly reduce the complexity 
of the problem. 
 
AEMC (2009, p. vi) expects that the expanded RET and to a lesser extent the CPRS 
will fundamentally change the utilisation of the network over time both between regions 
and within regions.  These expanded changes to flows are likely to put pressure on the 
existing framework governing transmission and distribution (AEMC 2009, p. vii).  So, 
AEMC recommends a local price signal for generators adjusted for congestion, as the 
locational price signal will lead to more efficient decisions.  The AEMC (2011b, p. iv) 
proposal for a single national co-ordinating TNSP to manage transmission planning 
and a NEM wide transmission business to manage locational marginal pricing for 
generators (AEMC 2011b, pp. iii-iv) is as close as the AEMC could come within their 
terms of reference to recommending monopoly ownership of transmission grid. 
9.7 Privatisation induced maladaptation and alternatives 
This section discusses (DRET 2011a) white paper calling on the privatisation of state 
owned energy companies.  The privatisation of state owned enterprises (SOEs) has 
potential for maladaptation to climate change in the following ways: 
• importing culturally insensitive CEOs to cover the perceived shortage of 
Australian CEOs to manage the newly privatised energy companies; 
• the change in focus from the three-year election cycle to a quarterly business 
reporting cycle;   
• the failure to address fragmentation of a natural monopoly; 
• being offered one policy option when there are alternatives to the simple false 
dichotomy of either state ownership or private ownership; 
• selling assets at the tail end of the global financial crisis is poor timing; 
• privatised coal generators requiring subsidies to shut down; 
• increasing the complexity of smart meter deployment; and 
• confusing retail customer churning for market efficiency. 
 
The culturally insensitivity of non-Australian CEOs controlling large natural monopolies 
is a potential source of maladaptation for the NEM.  For instance Oakes (2009) 
interviews the new CEO of Telstra, David Thodey, about the previous US imported 
CEO Sol Trujillo.  During Trujillo’s tenure about $25 billion was wiped from Telstra’s 
market value and customer complaints increased by 300%.  News (2007) reports the 
then Prime Minister John Howard complaining about Trujilo’s 30% pay increase of $11 
million being an abuse of the capitalist system.  Natural monopolies are vulnerable to 
such abuse and there is little need for restraint for Trujillo with no long term vested 
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interest in Australia’s well-being.  Additionally, Trujillo was constantly in conflict with the 
political leaders of Australia over a wide range of issues.  In contrast the current 
Australian CEO’s of the NBN and Telstra, Michael Quigley and Thodey just quietly and 
diplomatically go about their business. 
 
The change from state ownership with a three year election cycle to the free market 
with quarterly reporting periods promotes short-termism in the energy sector where 
assets have a life of 40 years or more.  The White Paper also claims that private 
companies are more innovative as a reason for privatisation.  The inventiveness and 
short-termism of the free market is exemplified by Enron who invented numerous 
techniques to improve quarterly results.  Enron was audited by Arthur Anderson who 
provided Enron with a clean bill of health shortly before Enron’s bankruptcy.  Given 
Australia’s relative lack of corruption shown in Table 9-1 and lack of experience in 
dealing with people from such a business culture, there is cause to seriously doubt a 
role for foreign citizens managing Australia’s energy assets or a requirement for a raft 
of audit legislation to contain inappropriate behaviour. 
 
Additionally, the transfer of ownership from state to private sector fails to address the 
issue of fragmentation in the NEM, in particular the natural monopoly that is the NEM 
grid.  However, there is the remote possibility of mergers and acquisitions resulting in a 
single holding company for transmission and distribution but this rationalisation process 
would be very torturous and wasteful.  For instance following Telstra’s privatisation and 
leadership by Trujillo, the retail and network arms of Telstra are being separated to 
form the NBN and Telstra retail.  This experiment in privatisation of a combined 
network and a retail business provides a tortured and wasteful route to rationalisation 
of the network as a natural monopoly under government control and the retail business 
in the private sector. 
 
Furthermore, the White Paper also offers a false dichotomy of either private ownership 
or state ownership.  Banks (2009) calls for policy based on evidence and for policy 
advice to offer alternatives to help prevent ideology informing policy.  There are 
alternatives to this dichotomy.  For instance KEPCO is 51% owned by the South 
Korean government and the reminder in private hands.  This split ownership allows 
KEPCO to more readily raise capital, which is one of the reasons suggested for 
privatisation.  KEPCO is a world leader in innovation, so the White Paper’s innovation 
argument for 100% privatisation is weak.  Another alternative is state and Federal 
Governments maintain 51% joint ownership of a company that owns all transmission 
and distribution in the NEM to address fragmentation and fully privatise all generation 
and retail assets to address conflict of interest issues.  There are alternatives to total 
privatisation that would better address fragmentation and conflict of interest and would 
be less susceptible to free market failures like Enron.  Section 4.4.1 discusses a 
research question to test the adaption performance of alternative economic structures 
to climate change. 
 
Selling assets at the tail end of the GFC is poor timing for two reasons: 
 
• the credit contraction reducing the saleable value of the assets; and 
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• the uncertain economic conditions warranting a discount on the value of the 
assets. 
This uncertainty discount or risk premium induced by the GFC is compounded by the 
forthcoming introduction of the ETS.  This credit contraction and risk premium could be 
avoided by selling the assets after the global recovery from the GFC and after the ETS 
establishes some stability. 
 
However, the following issue remains for privatised coal generators.  Namely, members 
of the ageing fleet of coal generators will eventually become uneconomic to run once 
the ETS comes into effect when the Federal Government will come under pressure to 
offer compensation, as is currently the case with the brown coal generators in Victoria.  
This scenario undermines posited gains from privatising the coal generators.  Other 
than reducing conflict of interest to grid access, the gains from privatisation are 
marginal because the NEM trades via a gross pool market, so coal generators are 
already subject to an essential feature of market discipline.  Government compensation 
to privatised coal generators to shut down due to the CPRS remains a vex issue. 
 
Furthermore, the introduction of in-house-display equipped smart meters and of 
dynamic pricing will have a large impact on ameliorating peak demand.  The issue over 
whether retail is privatised detracts from the national roll out of smart meters and the 
introduction of dynamic pricing.  The privatisation of retail and customer churning 
makes a systematic roll out of smart meters more challenging as the benefits from 
smart meters are spread amongst four stakeholders: the customer, retailer, distribution 
operator and transmission operator (WEC 2010).  Due to customer churning, the 
retailers are unable to guarantee returns from the smart meter installations, so 
installation is usually organised by the distribution operator.  However, the stakeholder 
organising the roll out will determine a suite of smart meter features that benefits itself, 
leaving out desirable features that benefit the other stakeholders.  For instance the roll 
out of smart meters in Victoria was organised by the distribution operators where the 
feedback advantages of the smart meters was promulgated to the public to smooth the 
way for the installations but the in-house-displays became an optional extra to be 
purchased by the customer.  This caused an adverse customer reaction who felt 
misguided by the distributors.  There is a requirement for careful evaluation of smart 
meter features to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from installation. 
 
Additionally, there is confusion in the literature between retail customer churning and 
market efficiency.  Any relationship between churning and market efficiency will be 
modest unless the customer has all the available pricing options presented in an 
unbiased way that can be readily compared.  Hence the retail market requires design 
to ameliorate information asymmetry to harness the full benefit for the customer.  A 
website comparing all the retail pricing options and the ability to swap retail provider on 
the website would go some way to meeting these requirements.  Additionally, an opt-in 
rather than an opt-out clause for door-to-door sales would reduce biased presentations 
and reduce unnecessary churning.  Sections 3.1 and 3.2 further discuss privatisation of 
retail and generation and the introduction of smart meters and dynamic pricing, 
respectively. 
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9.8 Further criticisms of the CPRS 
Chapter 7 discusses how incentives for renewable energy should be structured to 
engender a robust secure energy infrastructure that will eventually lead to a high 
penetration of non-intermittent renewable energy infrastructure resilient and adaptable 
to climate change.  This will need to combine the benefits of decentralised energy, 
centralised energy, renewable electricity, renewable gas and renewable heat 
infrastructure rather than electricity infrastructure alone with all of its intendant 
problems going forward into the 21st century.  
 
The current structure of the CPRS will not deliver the desired results above in isolation 
as discussed in Sections 10.2 and 10.4.  Further arguments against the CPRS are the 
lack of transparent to consumers as it applies to the wholesale price of electricity and 
so attaches a carbon cost to all forms of energy generation including low carbon 
natural gas and zero carbon renewable energy.  This implies that generators are not 
really incentivised to reduce their emissions as they can simply pass on the costs 
through the wholesale market, as their competitors do.  This argument is only partially 
valid.  It is true that the CPRS lack transparency as it acts through the market.  
However, alter the introduction of the CPRS fossil fuel generators have an additional 
cost to non-fossil generator.  This cost imposition relatively incentivises renewable 
energy and disincentives fossil generators. 
 
Regarding lack of transparency, consumers cannot see the carbon tax on their energy 
bills so there is no driver or incentive for consumers to implement energy efficiency to 
switch to lower carbon fuels or generate their own energy.  The argument against this 
lack of transparency is that the carbon price signal contains all the information required 
to make the optimal decision.  However, there are well documented biases that show 
that people are imperfect optimisers (Bell 2009 sec. 2.1.3.3).  Additionally, people have 
bounded rationality (Simon 1972), so it is perfectly rational to use rule-of-thumb.  
Tisdell (2013) discusses the implications of bounded rationality within the electricity 
industry. 
 
As previously discussed, the CPRS is definitely not a standalone solution. The 
transparency issue is just one more reason to consider compliments to the CRPS, such 
as, those taken in UK and Germany. 
9.9 Further alternatives or compliments to the CPRS 
This section describes UK and German schemes that are used in addition to the 
European CPRS.  The section also discusses criticisms of these schemes. 
9.9.1 Climate Change Levy in the UK  
The Climate Change Levy (CCL) (HMRC 2013) introduced by the Labour Government 
in the UK in 2001 and extended by the incoming Conservative led Coalition 
Government to 2023. The CCL applies to non-domestic energy users but was fiscal 
neutral in that the cost of the CCL was offset by a 0.3% employer’s rate reduction in 
National Insurance contributions. The residential and transport sectors are exempt from 
the CCL as are good quality combined heat and power (CHP) and renewable energy. 
 Analysis of institutional adaptability    207 
 
A reduction of up to 65% (originally 80% on start-up of the CCL) from the CCL may be 
gained by energy-intensive users provided they sign a Climate Change Agreement 
which commits the user to specified energy or carbon reduction targets within a 
specified time period (typically 5 years) which are agreed between the Government and 
each industry sector having regard to the nature and type of use of energy for each 
industry sector. 
 
As the CCL is shown on energy bills this also provides a transparent incentive for 
consumers to implement energy efficiency and switch to CHP and/or renewable energy. 
Energy companies and a new breed of Energy Services Companies (ESCOs) were 
also incentivised to provide and finance a wide range of energy services to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
This funding mechanism for CCL is flawed because it effectively acts as a tax on the 
poorer households to subsidise the richer households to install energy efficiency 
equipment.  This situation is compound by the link between poorer people being more 
likely to be in rental accommodation and there lacks incentive for landlord to install 
energy efficiency equipment.  A similar situation is analysed within an Australian 
context in Bell and Foster (2012) regarding the installation of solar PV and the 
residential solar PV feed-in tariff.  The findings are the requirement for incentive for 
landlords to install solar PV and a method to split the benefits of the installation 
between the landlord and the tenant.  In contrast, homeowners can and do extend their 
mortgages to install such equipment. It must be recognised that in the long term 
installation of solar PV or energy efficiency equipment will benefit everyone by 
moderating future electricity price rises but the CCL and Australian solar feed-in tariffs 
are a regressive way to achieve this goal. 
9.9.2 Renewable Energy Sources Act in Germany 
An alternative approach to reducing emissions and moving towards a renewable 
energy future is Germany’s Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG).  This act became 
law in 2000 and was amended in 2004, 2009 and 2012.  In 2011, around 17% of 
electricity, 8% of heat and 6% of fuel used in Germany was generated from renewable 
sources.  The 2012 Act set a target to increase the share of renewable energy to 40% 
by 2020 and to 80% by 2050 with similar targets for greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. 
 
The three main principles of the EEG are: 
 
• investment protection through guaranteed feed-in tariffs and connection 
requirements; 
• no charge to Germany’s public purse; and 
• innovation by falling feed-in tariffs (degression of 1% a year) 
 
The innovation by falling feed-in tariff is intended to exert cost pressure on 
manufacturers leading to technologies becoming more efficient and less costly. 
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Another outcome of the EEG is to move Germany away from fossil and nuclear fuels 
and centralised electricity infrastructure towards renewable energy sources and a 
decentralised electricity infrastructure, taking advantage of decentralised thermal 
energy networks and renewable gases.  The decentralised energy approach generates 
greater economic benefits than the cost of the EEG through avoided grid network 
investment and charges and other savings such as reduced environmental impacts and 
related economic benefits. According to a European Commission study, the net benefit 
of the EEG exceeds the additional costs of initial investment by 3.2 billion Euros.  In 
addition, the EEG generates more competition, more jobs and more rapid deployment 
for manufacturing. 
 
Germany now has one of the most expensive domestic electricity prices in world.  This 
situation begs for a more cost effective approach.  The EEG has the innate problem of 
using a calculated feed-in tariff rather than use a more cost effective market determines 
feed-in tariff.  Large scale and residential scale renewable energy requires different 
methods to develop a market determined feed-in tariff.  
 
Wood and Muller (2012) provide a comprehensive discussion of the use of a feed-in 
tariff reverse auction for large scale solar PV capacity.  A reverse auction involves 
would-be sellers making lower bids to undercut other bidders to provide a good or 
service to a buyer.  This approach is well suited to developing a portfolio of renewable 
energy, as discussed in Section 6.12.  However, feed-in tariff reverse auctions are 
unsuitable for small scale solar PV for three reasons: inequity; the transaction costs 
involved for numerous participants in the auctions; and the logistical cost of maintaining 
numerous feed-in tariff rates. 
 
Bell and Foster (2012) discuss a market determined feed-in tariff to promote the spread 
of solar PV and other small scale renewables in the residential sector.  Where there is 
a requirement to establish price signals to enable DSM, such as, the introduction of 
TOU billing and TOS payments for non-scheduled generators.  Together TOU and 
TOS payments provide appropriate price signals for the diffusion of energy storage 
technologies, such as batteries, into the NEM.  The eventual deployment of EVs, with 
their large battery storage, could aid DSM if the appropriate TOU and TOS price 
signals are in place. Without these price signals, EVs will exacerbate the existing peak 
demand problem in the NEM. 
